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The context
The OECD’s Inclusive Framework is currently 
considering two substantial tax reform plans, 
Pillar One and Pillar Two. These are intended 
to develop a global consensus on methods 
for taxing the digitalised economy, but in their 
current form would have broad implications 
for international tax architecture in general, 
and particularly for the control of base 
erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS).
This brief focuses on one component of 
Pillar One: Amount B. This would modify 
the OECD’s transfer pricing Transactional 
Net Margin Method (TNMM), as applied 
to ‘routine’ marketing functions of 
distribution companies. The TNMM, since 
its inception in 1995, has become central 
to tax administration in many countries. 
This is because multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) commonly establish ‘limited risk’ 
subsidiaries in countries where they operate, 
to perform not only distribution functions, 
but also manufacturing and service-provider 
functions. MNEs argue that because 
subsidiaries incur only limited business risks 
and perform only ‘routine’ functions, they 
should be permitted under the arm’s-length 
standard to earn relatively low profit margins 
in-country, and to transfer the remainder of 
their profits, in the form of management fees 
and other intragroup payments, to affiliates 
in other countries. The result has been high 
levels of BEPS.
Tax administrations are supposed to use 
the TNMM to limit profit-shifting from limited 
risk subsidiaries, including subsidiaries 
engaged in distribution, manufacturing and 
service provision. The tax authority must (i) 
perform a detailed, case-by-case ‘functional 
analysis’ of the controlled subsidiary, and 
(ii) using information from commercially 
available financial databases, carry out 
‘comparables studies’ on entities performing 
similar functions to the controlled subsidiary, 
ideally in the same country. It must then use 
statistical analysis to compute an ‘arm’s-
length range’ of permissible profit levels, 
proposing adjustments if reported taxable 
income falls below the bottom of the range.
How the TNMM has 
performed in practice
When introduced, the TNMM was intended 
as a relatively efficient means by which 
tax administrations could benchmark the 
incomes of MNE subsidiaries operating in 
their jurisdictions. In practice, however, the 
requirement to perform functional analyses 
has imposed very large personnel burdens on 
tax administrations, and in many developing 
countries has been infeasible. Similarly, access 
to financial databases has proven prohibitively 
expensive to many developing countries. 
Even where databases are available, (i) the 
expertise required to use them may not be 
available, and (ii) the volume of data available 
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is generally insufficient to generate statistically 
useful estimates of ‘arm’s length range’. In 
addition, for technical reasons the TNMM is 
not capable of controlling taxpayers’ intragroup 
interest expenses, a major source of profit-shifting. 
The TNMM is therefore often an unsatisfactory 
tool for transfer pricing compliance even in 
wealthy countries, and in many developing 
countries fails in its mission to constrain 
outbound transfers of income in connection with 
taxpayers’ profit-shifting arrangements.
The Amount B proposal
This would simplify the TNMM as it applies to 
‘routine’ distribution operations of MNE groups, 
primarily by allowing tax administrations 
to specify ‘fixed returns’ for the distribution 
function. They would therefore not be required 
to perform detailed comparables searches. 
The working paper on which this policy brief 
is based expressed overall support for the 
Amount B proposal, but also addressed 
several unanswered questions raised by the 
proposal. (After publication of the working 
paper, the OECD released an updated version 
of its proposal, on which this brief is based.)
Key issues
1. Who would be responsible for 
determining ‘fixed returns’? The current 
proposal would require tax authorities to 
determine ‘fixed returns’, presumably by 
reference to the analysis of comparables, 
for various categories of distributors, in 
different geographical locations. This 
politically sensitive and technically 
demanding function might be performed 
by national tax administrations, regional 
organisations, or global organisations. The 
question of who would determine fixed 
returns has not been addressed in detail in 
OECD discussions released to date.
2. Might a ‘formulary’ approach to 
determining fixed returns greatly 
simplify the administration of Amount 
B? Commenting on an early version 
of the proposal, two MNEs, Johnson & 
Johnson and Procter & Gamble, suggested 
that arm’s-length fixed returns might be 
approximated, without the analysis of 
comparables, simply by multiplying some 
fraction of the local distribution company’s 
sales by a fraction (e.g. 25 per cent) of 
the MNE’s global return on sales. This 
would eliminate the need for a central tax 
authority to estimate fixed returns based 
on comparables searches. Despite their 
potential benefits, however, these proposals 
have not, at least publicly, been considered 
in depth by OECD. In view of their potential 
for greatly simplifying administration, while 
yielding results similar to those reached 
under the less-administrable comparables-
based approach, the Inclusive Framework 
should give them serious consideration.
3. Should the TNMM, as applied under the 
Amount B proposal, be modified to be 
effective in controlling related-party 
interest deductions? Currently, the TNMM 
benchmarks a taxpayer’s ‘operating income’, 
which generally is income before interest 
payments. It is therefore not effective in 
controlling profit-shifting through interest 
payments to related parties. This could be 
remedied if the TNMM were amended to 
benchmark ‘earnings before tax’ or a similar 
measure of income after interest payments. 
This would render the TNMM much more 
effective in controlling profit-shifting. The latest 
version of the Pillar One Blueprint leaves open 
whether fixed returns will be determined under 
a before- or after-interest basis; the latter 
would render Amount B much more useful.  
4. Should the Amount B approach be 
extended beyond distributors, to also 
encompass limited-risk manufacturing 
and service-providing companies? 
The TNMM is defective not only in its 
application to distribution companies, but 
also manufacturing and service-provider 
companies. Strong arguments could 
therefore be made to reform TNMM as 
it applies to all categories of taxpayers. 
Against this, however, problems in applying 
the method to distributors seem especially 
troublesome to developing countries. 
Moreover, even applying the ‘fixed return’ 
approach only to distributors is likely 
to require a substantial analytical and 
rule-making effort. The current blueprint 
envisions changing TNMM only as it applies 
to distributors. This incremental approach 
seems prudent, so long as reforms are later 
made to TNMM as it is applied to other 
kinds of taxpayers.
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